A communitarian solution for Haiti’s security: Lessons from Rio de Janeiros’ pacifying police by Gorczeski, Vinicius
A communitarian solution for Haiti’s 
security: Lessons from Rio de Janeiros’ 
pacifying police 
Vinicius Gorczeski 
Centre for Social Sciences, email: vinicius.gorczeski@tk.mta.hu: +36.1.2246700/5213 
Abstract   Haiti, a small country in the Caribbean, is a symbol of violence and lack of state presence. The police 
forces operating in the country have long done little to restore peace and are seen as illegitimate by locals. Multiple 
international attempts failed to control an escalating trajectory of violence, which have long contributed to 
undermining the capacity of the Haitian government to build up its own structures to react to violence. This paper 
will offer tentative solutions to unite promising, but underdeveloped ideas experimented in Haiti to solve violent 
episodes with a communitarian approach to dealing with violence. It does so by analyzing the Pacifying Police 
Unit (UPP) program, adopted by the city of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil to counter structured violence and insecurity, 
and how its best practices can be adopted in the Haitian context. Rather than solving major structural problems 
driving violence in a weak state, the experimental solution put forward for Haiti works toward empowering part 
of local government’s institutions to build up actions in order to alleviate immediate violent episodes that, if 
successful, could be scaled-up as policy solutions.  
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Following yet another American intervention in 1994 that overthrown a military 
government and restored the power of the first elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, civilians welcomed their president with hopes: one of them regarded solutions for a 
violent society, oppressed by an overwhelmingly violent and official security force, wrote Eirin 
Mobekk in an article published in 2010.1 By abolishing the Army in 1995 — creating a police 
force afterwards (with foreign support and influence) —, Aristide sought to eliminate the power 
of an institution used to promoting coup d’états, claimed the same author. The idea, welcomed 
by Haitians who wanted a communitarian police service, ended up achieving neither the first 
goal nor the latter.2 Instead, what was left was an untrustworthy police force, seen by locals as 
illegitimate.3 
This article will offer tentative solutions to unite an already existing and promising idea 
involving security databases for the use of a police service that promotes peace. In Rio de 
Janeiro’s favelas, in Brazil, a similar police unit — the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) — has had 
promising results in building peace in places used to violence.4 In an experiment, a Haitian 
violent community could learn from this program’s mistakes and achievements. After assessing 
the results, the idea can be tweaked and scaled up. 
The solution neither has the scope nor the power to address all issues involving security 
in Haiti. The recipe for that requires a certain level of strength in the government’s institution, 
as put forth by Francis Fukuyama, in which strength means the state’s capacity to provide 
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citizens with an efficient public service5 — in our case security —, that Haiti does not yet have 
as a consequence of French colonization and succeeding international interventions6. 
 
A botched process 
 
The negative outcome for Haiti’s security was deepened by the abolishment of the Army 
in 1995, according to Mobbek.7 The same author wrote that former officials received training 
by the US Army in military facilities in Haiti. Also, Mobbek explained that the future police 
officers would keep a tradition of using force rather than peacekeeping as a method. Without a 
legitimate, trained, and accountable police force, the Haitian National Police (PNH) would 
emerge in the country in 1996 made up by around 1,500 recycled members from the Army, 
some of them trained by the International Organization of Migration — , which sharpened the 
division between locals, who never received trainings, and the government.8 Without a reliable 
source of information and data on previous Human Rights abuses committed by armies, the 
new PNH’s management had no accountable ways of figuring out capable cops from abusers.9  
The way the security forces were implemented was a signal, once again, of the 
international community failure in building a reliable and efficient police unit,10 in a country 
that has been falling apart intervention after occupation: in the case of the US, first for almost 
two decades in the early 20th century, when its Marine troops arrived at the island aimed at 
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spreading American control over Haiti against European economic interests11; later in the 
middle 1990s to restore democracy and form a state that never was. If the latter interventions 
had aimed at building a nation-state in Haiti, what was left was a Republic of more 10,000 
NGOs, a booming trend that began more than three decades ago.12 
 
A violent consequence 
 
The NGOs seemed unable to change the consequences that Haitians face: ever since the 
creation of the PNH, the Haitian National Police, in the end of 1995, they got used to feeling 
that they are less safe, and that there is an illegal cooperation between the police and local 
gangs,13 the latter being able to accumulate what the police force has never had: trust and 
legitimacy in their local territories.14 Homicides have been escalating year by year, reaching a 
rate of 10 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012, from 5,1 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2007.15 In Haiti, Civilians own 200,000 guns, while the government holds 13,000.16 If guns 
should not be taken as tools to deal with violence, in Haiti gun-ownership highlight the 
government’s challenges in competing with local militias. 
There’s also an international competition to provide Haitian with security. The UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) arrived in the country in 2004 with 6,700 units 
aimed at peacekeeping, but its methods are far from popular and its results misleading: it has 
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been undermining an already fragile government in its attempts to combat criminals; it does 
not have citizens’ support,17 and has favored a flourishing black market.18 In Havocscope’s 
rank of world’s most valuable black markets, Haiti is in the 58th position, ahead of Bolivia — 
a cocaine producer —,19 with a black market based on drug trafficking and that’s worth 500 
million dollars.20 
 
A communitarian remedy 
 
Even though NGOs haven’t achieved their goals of building a strong state in Haiti — of 
many of them indeed failed to legalize themselves21 to take advantage of more than 6 billion 
dollars in foreign aid, already disbursed to NGOs after the country was struck by an Earthquake 
in 201022 —, their work can be crucial in helping the country establish a better security service, 
especially in the short run.  
There are promising ideas arousing. The Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a humanitarian 
aid organization, has designed a system to track violent acts in Haiti.23 The goal is to offer the 
police and other NGOs a better response in chasing down violent acts by areas. With a 
collaborative, real-time updated application, the organization has been able to identify areas in 
Port-au-Prince where criminality is rampant — “pins” are used to label types of crimes 
                                                          
17 Geoff Burt, “The Battle for Haiti’s Security Is Largely Political,” IPI Global Observatory, accessed 
May 20, 2017, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/07/haiti-philippe-privert-minustah/. 
18 James Cockayne, “Winning Haiti’s Protection Competition: Organized Crime and Peace Operations 
Past, Present and Future,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 1 (February 2009): 77–99, 
doi:10.1080/13533310802485476. 
19 “Country Risk Ranking – Impact of Security Threats to Countries,” accessed May 20, 2017, 
http://www.havocscope.com/country-profile/. 
20 “Haiti Security Threats – Data and Information,” accessed May 20, 2017, 
http://www.havocscope.com/tag/haiti/. 
21 Mark Schuller, “Seeing Like a ‘Failed’ NGO: Globalization–s Impacts on State and Civil Society in 
Haiti,” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 30, no. 1 (2007): 67–89. 
22 “Key Statistics | Haiti Relief,” accessed May 20, 2017, http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/lessons-from-
haiti/key-statistics/#toc-1-b. 
23 Sony Belizaire, “Haiti Security Risk Management in Red Area Project Development” (Catholic Relief 
Services), accessed May 20, 2017, http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc15/papers/125_16.pdf. 
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committed in a map.24 The existence of such a database can help the police chase down violent 
acts by areas, and international missions and other NGOs to channel their efforts toward 
peacekeeping and security assistance. 
A parallel step is to establish a communitarian police base in regions where crime is 
rampant — the location can be decided according to the evidence collected by the Catholic 
Relief Services’ database. This police service finds inspiration in a project launched in Rio de 
Janeiro in 2008. Called Pacifying Police Unit (UPP in Portuguese), its goal was to take over 
“favela’s control from the organized crime, paving the way for establishing security and social 
services in these areas that count neither with social development nor proper infrastructure,25 
and that resembles many of Haiti’s landscapes and shantytowns. A study on the UPPs has 
shown that the program was launched in a top-down approach with different phases of 
implementation.26  
According to the report, a tactic military intervention was launched to “expel” criminals 
from the region with the use of force. That was followed by a stabilizing operation that paved 
the way for recently trained peacekeeping police officers to settle down in the region, offering 
social services to the community. They received bonuses in cash, were not tied to the military 
police structure in Brazil, and had recently “graduated” from the academia — the goal was to 
avoid allocating experienced police officers, whose mentality was rooted in the traditional use 
of force.27 The model’s supporters claimed it helped make the police less violent and closer to 
                                                          
24 Sony Belizaire, “Haiti Security Risk Management in Red Area Project Development” (Catholic Relief 
Services), accessed May 20, 2017, http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc15/papers/125_16.pdf. 
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the community.28 According to an article published by a Brazilian magazine, the rate of 
homicides fell 66% between 2008 and 2014, and crimes involving the police plummeted by 
91%.29 Critiques of UPPs declared that the bases were established without previous 
participation from the communities, leading to a lack of trust in the service in some more than 
20 UPPs.30  
A similar model can help Haiti diminish their rates of violence and empower local 
citizens with public services that otherwise would be unreachable. However, instead of 
imposing the police in the area as it happened in Brazil, the NGO should first identify local 
civil leaders who would be interested in participating in the service. With their support, 
potential young applicants to the PNH could be attracted, trained with a humanitarian and 
peacekeeping approach, in which they would be encouraged to believe that their power is to 
ease their neighbors’ access to the public services (information on where to obtain a document) 
and social activities (such as sports or whatever activity that is liked by locals) and mediate 
local conflicts — acting as if they were local mayors supported by the community. The more 
such activities are done, the more bonuses could be offered to them in cash as awards as an 
incentive. 
 A local campaign in which the NGO stress the idea that these peacekeepers are citizens’ 
allies and are there to help them is essential and was identified as a key component of the 
UPPs.31 This trust-building process is supported by a study which says that in Haiti’s streets 
                                                          
28 “BBC Brasil - Notícias - Três anos de UPPs no Rio: Entenda os avanços e desafios do programa,” 
accessed May 19, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2011/12/111219_qa_upps_jc.shtml. 
29 “A Vocação Pacífica Das UPPs No Rio de Janeiro,” Revistaepoca.globo.com, accessed May 20, 2017, 
http://epoca.globo.com/ideias/choque-de-realidade/noticia/2015/04/vocacao-pacifica-das-upps-no-rio-de-
janeiro.html. 
30 RELATÓRIO FINAL, “‘The Hill’s Owners’: An explanatory analysis of the impact of the Pacifying 
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the “feeling” of having power plays an important role among citizens on the street.32 
Encouraging this feeling in the right way in a communitarian police force may convert potential 




It’s worth experimenting the idea in small scale, even if it is to alleviate part of a broader 
and more complex issue on security in Haiti. Without a revision in the criminal code in Haiti, 
that dates to the 19th century33 — thus in effect before the Human Rights declarations was 
established in 194834 —; without protection to judges; without a long-lasting humanitarian 
training for all the police officers35; without prisons that offer the minimum rights to detainees36 
as defined by the UN,37 like giving detainees the right to a public hearing right after an arrest, 
Haiti’s rule of law will not be fully achieved. But as the country is needy for short-term 
solutions, a build-trusting communitarian police service backed up in a promising and 
innovative work done by local NGOs can be a first step in this direction. 
                                                          
32 Chelsey Kivland, “Becoming a Force in the Zone: Hedonopolitics, Masculinity, and the Quest for 
Respect on Haiti’s Streets,” Cultural Anthropology 29, no. 4 (November 10, 2014): 672–98, 
doi:10.14506/ca29.4.05. 
33 1. “Haiti – Pretrial Rights International,” accessed May 20, 2017, 
http://www.pretrialrights.org/haiti/. 
34 UN General Assembly. United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 1948, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf. 
35 E. Mobekk, “International Involvement in Restructuring and Creating Security Forces: The Case of 
Haiti,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 12, no. 3 (September 2001): 97–114, doi:10.1080/714005396. 
36 “Haiti – Pretrial Rights International,” accessed May 20, 2017, http://www.pretrialrights.org/haiti/. 
37 “United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules),” accessed 
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